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Frank L. Maraist & Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center of
Louisiana State University. I am self-conscious about this footnote because Charlie
Sullivan wrote a delightful piece, Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk
Footnote, 93 GEO. L.J. 1093 (2005). This footnote is where I often have indicated that
Charlie, Mike Zimmer, Rebecca White, Steve Willborn, Sandra Sperino, Mike Selmi, and a
few others reviewed an earlier draft of my Essay. I asked them to review drafts because I
trusted them to identify errors and suggest ways in which I could improve the piece. Now,
after reading Charlie’s study of the asterisk footnote, I must ask myself if I also did it to
have “star” names that would attract the attention of law review editors. Id. at 1116. I
probably did. Alas, Charlie and my other friends did not review a draft of this Essay, and
that is why it may include errors. I, however, thank my research assistant, Taylor Ashworth,
LSU Law Class of 2020, for improving the paper. I also thank Kristyn A. Couvillion, LSU
Class of 2021, for helpful and inspiring discussions about her law review comment that
informed this Essay.
1
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act III, sc. 4.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A GUIDE IN EXPLORATIONS OF THE UNIVERSE OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. What the Deplanetization2 of Pluto Can Teach Us About
Employment Discrimination Law
I always have been fascinated with astronomy. I grew up, as most
people alive today, believing that our solar system, the Milky Way, is
comprised of nine planets, and I memorized and learned about those
planets. Pluto, discovered in 1930 and classified as a planet, was probably
my favorite. I am not sure why—perhaps because it was farthest from the
sun or because it was the smallest. In 2006, the galaxy, and with it my
childhood beliefs, changed forever. In terms of planets, the solar system
shrank.
On August 24, 2006, astronomers in the International
Astronomical Union (IAU) voted to strip tiny Pluto of its status as a planet
and reclassify it as a dwarf planet.3 The vote also established three
categories of objects in our solar system: planets, dwarf planets, and small
solar system bodies.4 The vote of the astronomers was controversial.5 The
debate over classification of Pluto had raged for over a decade. A
compromise proposal would have preserved Pluto’s planethood, but it
would have done so by defining planet so as to bring three more celestial
objects within the definition.6 The winning proposal, which demoted Pluto,
was voted on by only 424 astronomers who remained for the last day of the
conference in Prague.7 One commentator described the decision as a
victory of scientific reasoning over historical and cultural influences.8
Astronomer Michael Brown in 2005 had discovered an object larger
than Pluto and was credited with discovery of a planet. He lost that honor,

2

I thought that I was coining this term, and I was proud of my creativity, but I was
wrong. See, e.g., Tony Long & Doug Cornelius, Aug. 24, 2006: Pluto Deplanetized, WIRED
(Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/08/0824pluto-deplanetized/. I was dismayed
to learn that “deplanetized” has another meaning in the Urban Dictionary: “Unaware of
one’s surroundings due to abuse of chemical substances; extremely high.” Captain Tito,
Deplanetized, URB. DICTIONARY (Apr. 09, 2006), https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.p
hp?term=deplanetized. That alternative definition has nothing to do with this Essay.
3
See, e.g., Robert Roy Britt, Pluto Demoted: No Longer a Planet in Highly
Controversial Definition, SPACE.COM (Aug. 24, 2006), https://www.space.com/2791-plutodemoted-longer-planet-highly-controversial-definition.html; see also Shankar Vedantam,
For Pluto, a Smaller World After All, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR2006082400109.html.
4
Britt, supra note 3.
5
Id.
6
Robert Roy Britt, Details Emerge on Plan to Demote Pluto, SPACE.COM (Aug. 19,
2006), https://www.space.com/2770-details-emerge-plan-demote-pluto.html.
7
See Britt, supra note 3.
8
See id.
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however, as that object, too, was reclassified as a dwarf planet.9 Ironically,
it was Brown’s discovery of a celestial body larger than Pluto that finally
doomed Pluto. The New York Times injected its gravitas into the
controversy, running an editorial arguing that Pluto should be
downgraded.10 Brown argued for preserving the planet status of Pluto
because of “habit—75 years of calling Pluto a planet—should trump any
scientific definition.”11 Alas, in the end, we lost a planet and the solar
system as many of us knew it. The deplanetization of Pluto may have
something to teach us about the need to revise our map of the universe of
employment discrimination.
In one of his recent outstanding articles on employment
discrimination law,12 Professor Charles A. Sullivan states that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly described disparate treatment and disparate impact as
though they comprise the entire universe of discrimination.13 In this Essay,
I want to probe that statement by Professor Sullivan, who has been one of
my principal guides in my explorations of the universe of employment
discrimination. We can think of our employment discrimination law as a
map or model of the universe of the discrimination that occurs in the
workplace (the universe of employment discrimination). As emotionally
painful as it was for many of us to lose little Pluto as a planet, modifying
forever our view of our solar system, we are years beyond the time when
the Supreme Court and/or Congress14 should reform employment
discrimination law to better map the many types of discrimination that
occur in the workplace. As with the deplanetization of Pluto, this process
should involve abandoning our traditions, customs, and outdated beliefs in
favor of a more realistic conception of the phenomenon of employment
9

See id.
Too Many Planets Numb the Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2005), https://www.nytimes.
com/2005/08/02/opinion/too-many-planets-numb-the-mind.html.
11
Id.
12
Professor Sullivan is a prolific scholar in areas beyond employment discrimination
law, including being the historian of the asterisk footnote. See supra note *.
13
Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 403 (2018) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Employing AI].
14
Congress, of course, enacted the federal employment discrimination laws. Congress
also has stepped in to amend the laws several times since their original enactment. What
Congress does primarily in the amendments is change the law pronounced in Supreme Court
decisions with which it disagrees. Sometimes Congress amends the laws to legislatively
overturn a single decision, as in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Congress also has
enacted amendments that overturn numerous Supreme Court decisions and effect other
changes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2018)).
10
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discrimination. Our revised map should follow the science and learning to
recognize a different, more expansive, and less structured employment
discrimination law. This reordering of the model is necessary in order to
more effectively achieve the objectives of the employment discrimination
laws—to deter/eradicate invidious discrimination in the workplace and to
provide compensation to victims of discrimination.15
Employment discrimination law seems to be vast and complex. I have
taught the course for over two decades, and I know that students beginning
their explorations find it to be confusing. The analogy between
employment discrimination law16 and the deplanetization of Pluto is not
that employment discrimination law is smaller than we thought; rather, it is
that the actual universe of employment discrimination (the phenomenon or
occurrence of discrimination in the workplace) is complex and vast, but our
map of it is inadequate. It contains too few terms to describe what is out
there, and the terms we use are a poor fit for the objects in that universe.
Yet, the Supreme Court tenaciously has clung to what is familiar,
traditional, and comfortable even as science, learning, and technology have
undermined its descriptive value.

15
The Court discussed the dual goals of deterrence/eradication of discrimination and
compensation in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413–25 (1975). The Court
identified the “primary objective” of Title VII as “achiev[ing] equality of employment
opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees.” Id. at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court then went
on to recognize that “[i]t is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Id. at 418. In her concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse, after Justice O’Connor applied the “statutory tort” label to
Title VII, she noted the two primary functions of Title VII: the deterrence goal related to
public policy and the compensation or make-whole goal. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 264–65 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Third Circuit eloquently
expressed the preeminence of the public policy:
[A]n act of employment discrimination is much more than an ordinary font of
tort law. The anti-employment discrimination laws are suffused with a
public aura for reasons that are well known . . . . A plaintiff in an
employment-discrimination case accordingly acts not only to vindicate his or
her personal interests in being made whole, but also as a “private attorney
general” to enforce the paramount public interest in eradicating invidious
discrimination.
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 514 U.S.
1034 (1995).
16
The distinction between “employment discrimination law” and the phenomenon of
“employment discrimination” is crucial to my thesis.
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B. Charlie Sullivan: One of My Guides in Explorations of the
Universe of Employment Discrimination
For decades Charlie Sullivan has explored the universe of
employment discrimination and our inadequate modeling of it in
employment discrimination law. He has insightfully identified the
mistakes that the Supreme Court has made in trying to describe that
universe with theories that are both too limited and inaccurate in their
description of the composition of the universe. The limitations and
inaccuracies of the current model seem destined to become starker with the
emergence of new technology.
I began writing about employment discrimination law in 1994. I met
the late, great Professor Mike Zimmer and Professor Deborah Calloway at
a conference at Stetson Law School in 1995. From that conference came
my first article on employment discrimination law.17 As a result of that
publication I met then-Professor and later Dean Rebecca White. When I
taught the course Employment Discrimination for the first time in 1996, I
used the casebook Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination,
which, over the years, has been the work of various combinations of Mike
Zimmer, Charlie Sullivan, Rebecca White, and Deborah Calloway. Not
long after teaching the course, I corresponded with Professor Charlie
Sullivan, and I met him at a conference years later.
I felt very privileged to be invited by Charlie to participate in this
conference and symposium issue honoring him and his scholarship. As I
thought about my subject, I wanted both to pay homage to Charlie’s
scholarship and to say something meaningful about employment
discrimination law. My first thought was that I once again would lambaste
the pretext framework developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green18 to evaluate disparate treatment claims. I have
done that for much of my career, with Charlie’s help and guidance. For
this conference, however, I wanted to do something different. I thought of
a draft Charlie recently sent me in which he explored why the “motivating
factor” standard of causation under the mixed-motives analysis has not
radically changed Title VII discrimination law to produce more victories
for plaintiffs: Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why “Motivating Factor”
Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII.19 That paper is a culmination, to
See William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at
Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 375 (1996).
18
411 U.S. 792, 792 (1973).
19
Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why “Motivating Factor”
Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII (Seton Hall Pub. L. Res. Paper, forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3431063 [hereinafter Sullivan, Making Too Much].
17
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date, of scholarship that Charlie began about thirty years ago,20 when he
wrote about the mixed-motives framework and the standards of causation
articulated by the Court in 1989 in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.21 I
thought that I would examine standards of causation under the pretext
framework, to which the great Mike Zimmer and I devoted much of our
scholarship, and under the mixed-motives analysis, on which Charlie
focused some of his scholarship. As I considered this possible topic, a law
review student whom I am advising this semester visited with me and
discussed her proposed topic—employment discrimination law as applied
to the use of artificial intelligence to make employment decisions. I then
began thinking about how inadequate the theories of discrimination and the
proof frameworks in employment discrimination law will be to address the
issues raised by such new technologies. This is not a new problem,
however, as much scholarship has demonstrated that the theories and
frameworks have been shown to be inaccurate depictions of how
employment discrimination actually occurs. Many scholars have written
about implicit bias and unconscious discrimination.22 Professor Linda
Hamilton Krieger’s groundbreaking article used social cognition theory to
demonstrate how poorly our law, which focuses on intent, motive, and
causation, depicts the actual occurrence of discrimination.23 Artificial
intelligence and other emerging technologies will only exacerbate the
problem.
As I turned to Charlie’s scholarship, I found that, as usual, Charlie had
gone before me in exploring this sector of the universe of employment
discrimination, writing an insightful and provocative article on the topic:
Employing AI.24
In Employing AI, Charlie wrote that the Supreme Court “has
repeatedly described [disparate treatment and disparate impact] as if they

20
Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107 (1991) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Accounting].
21
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
22
See, e.g., TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2017); Samuel Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2006); Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless
Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1061–62 (2017); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458,
484–89 (2001).
23
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1187 (1995).
24
Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 403.
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comprise the entire universe of ‘discrimination.’”25 Moreover, in that
article he questioned whether the time-honored dichotomy of theories of
discrimination will be adequate to address the challenges emerging now,
stating in his conclusion that “the Supreme Court’s bifurcation of all
discrimination into two theories, is very problematic, at least unless the
theories are radically revised.”26
It is not easy to navigate the universe of employment discrimination
or the model of it that we have developed in our employment
discrimination law. I am grateful to have had more knowledgeable,
experienced, and wise guides like Charlie, Mike, and Rebecca to keep me
largely on course in my exploration. I relied on their casebook to help me
learn the law. I sent them drafts of my articles, and they have helped me
stay on course as best they could. Without them, I often would have been
lost in that universe, and the explorations would not have been as enjoyable
without such companions.
In Section II, I describe in brief the current map of the universe of
employment discrimination. In Section III, I discuss three explorations of
that universe that Charlie and I have undertaken together: proof structures
and causation standards; influences of tort law on employment
discrimination law; and the inadequacy of the employment discrimination
theories to address the phenomenon of employment discrimination. In
Section IV, I explore how the Supreme Court and Congress should
deplanetize Pluto. I conclude, and I think Charlie agrees, that, as difficult
and disconcerting as it may be to relinquish the narrow view of the familiar
discrimination theories, Congress and the Supreme Court need to reform
their maps of the universe. Science and knowledge must prevail over
custom and history in order to achieve the grand and noble purposes of the
employment discrimination laws.
II. THE CURRENT MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
The employment discrimination map or model developed by the
Supreme Court is based on dichotomies.27 There are two theories of
discrimination, and they are distinct. According to the Supreme Court, this
dichotomy of theories comprises the entire universe of employment
discrimination.28 These two theories are said to emanate from two
25

Id.
Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 428.
27
See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Breaking Dichotomies at the Core of Employment
Discrimination Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 764 (2018).
28
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015); Sullivan, Employing AI,
26
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subsections of Title VII29—disparate treatment from §703(a)(1)30 and
disparate impact from § 703(a)(2).31 Disparate treatment is discrimination
that requires proof of motive,32 although intent often is substituted, and the
two terms are treated as interchangeable.33 Disparate impact, in contrast, is
defined as unintentional discrimination in which liability is based on a
disparate impact produced by a facially neutral test, criterion, or other
practice that cannot be justified by business necessity.34
Beneath the two theories are proof frameworks used by litigants to
prove claims of discrimination and used by the courts to analyze the
litigants’ claims. Under individual disparate treatment, the Supreme Court
developed two proof structures for proving and analyzing intentional
discrimination: the pretext framework first announced in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green35 and the mixed-motives framework articulated by
the Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,36 which was revised and
codified by Congress, at least for Title VII, 37 in the Civil Rights Act of
1991.38 The Court set forth the disparate impact theory and a rough version
of the affiliated proof framework in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.39 Congress

supra note 13, at 403; Sandra F. Sperino, Justice Kennedy’s Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REV.
1789, 1794 (2016).
29
See Texas Dept. Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2516–17 (2015).
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018).
31
Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2).
32
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
33
See, e.g., Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 405.
34
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
35
411 U.S. 792, 805–06 (1973).
36
490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989).
37
The Court explained that the mixed-motives framework does not apply under the
ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). The Court later
held that mixed motives is not applicable under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII in
University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). It
probably does not apply under the ADA, but the Supreme Court has not decided the issue,
and there is a split of authority on the issue. Compare Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt.
Co., Inc., 816 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in
applying but-for causation), and Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding mixed-motives analysis is not applicable to the ADA based on
Gross) and Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2010)
(same), with Hoffman v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 F. App’x 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2015)
(stating that standard of causation under the ADA is “motivating factor”), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 45 (2015), and Siring v. Or. St. Bd. of Higher Educ., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (D.
Or. 2013) (same).
38
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075–76
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The two parts of the mixed-motives analysis
are at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018) (“motivating factor”) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B) (same-decision defense).
39
401 U.S. 424, 431–432.
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revised and codified that disparate impact framework for Title VII, but not
the ADEA and the ADA, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.40
Disparate treatment was described by the Court early on as “the most
easily understood type of discrimination” because an employer engages in
unequal treatment of employees based on a protected characteristic.41 But
exploring the galaxy of disparate treatment is by no means easy, and the
Court has made it increasingly difficult as it has developed the theory. The
most difficult part of the exploration has been the two proof frameworks—
pretext and mixed-motives. It was once thought that the pretext analysis
applied to disparate treatment claims involving circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent, and the mixed-motives analysis applied to cases
involving direct evidence of discrimination.42 That dichotomy was based
on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse.43 In Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, however, the Supreme Court abrogated that
distinction.44 The Court held that a plaintiff asserting a Title VII individual
disparate treatment claim is not required to present direct evidence of
discrimination in order to be entitled to a “motivating factor”45 jury
instruction.46 The Court reasoned in Desert Palace that when Congress
codified a modified version of mixed motives in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 in §§ 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B), Congress said nothing of direct
evidence.47 The Desert Palace decision raised the question of whether the
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework survived the decision.48 If it did,
40

The framework is at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). The Supreme Court explained that the
statutory version of the disparate impact framework does not apply to the ADEA in Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
41
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
42
See generally Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse
Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 878–82
(2004); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead,
Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1910 (2004) [hereinafter Zimmer, The
New Discrimination Law].
43
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270–71 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
44
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).
45
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
46
Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101–02.
47
Id. at 98–99.
48
See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990–93 (D. Minn.
2003); Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From
Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 566
(2017); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decision Making and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REV. 741, 765–66 (2005); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating
Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03
(2004); Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1929–32; Jeffrey A. Van
Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell
Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
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what was the new line of demarcation between the two frameworks?
Courts of appeal, however, have misunderstood or ignored the Desert
Palace holding, reverting to the circumstantial evidence/direct evidence
dividing line.49 Ignoring Supreme Court precedent would seem to be a
problem, but perhaps not when the Supreme Court itself ignores its own
precedent. In Young v United Parcel Service, Inc., the Court majority
seemingly followed the lead of lower courts and forgot or ignored the
holding of Desert Palace, declaring that “a plaintiff can prove disparate
treatment either (1) by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or
decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic, or (2) by using the
burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.”50
In recent years, we have learned that the Court’s model of the
universe of employment discrimination lacks symmetry. The Supreme
Court in the past decade has declared that the mixed-motives proof
structure, which applies to the discrimination provision in Title VII, does
not apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,51 or the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.52 The asymmetry gives our model of the
universe of employment discrimination the appearance of being chaotic.
This asymmetrical model is the product of Congress providing a model of
the universe and the Supreme Court interpreting the model, with little
assurance that the Court understands the vision of Congress or that
Congress comprehends in depth the doctrine of the Court on which
Congress relies in amending the statutes.53
III. EXPLORATIONS WITH CHARLIE SULLIVAN
I have followed Charlie in explorations into three areas of
employment discrimination law: the proof frameworks/causation standards;
the influence of tort law on employment discrimination law; and the
inadequacy of the theories of discrimination.
Mike Zimmer, Charlie, and I each wrote several articles about the
proof frameworks and their associated standards of causation. One cannot
write about the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework without also writing
about the Price Waterhouse/Civil Rights Act of 199154 mixed-motives
into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003).
49
See, e.g., Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475
(5th Cir. 2015); Marable v. Marion Military Inst., 595 F. App’x. 921 (11th Cir. 2014).
50
575 U.S. 206, 212–13 (2015).
51
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs, 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009).
52
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
53
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance of
Congress’s Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157, 157–158 (2012).
54
The mixed-motives analysis was adopted by the Court from constitutional law in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1989), and was modified and codified
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framework. Yet, Mike and I wrote primarily about McDonnell Douglas.
Charlie explored principally the mixed-motives analysis, beginning with
his 1991 article, Accounting for Price Waterhouse, and culminating with
his recent article on the “motivating factor” standard of causation, Making
Too Much of Too Little?: Why “Motivating Factor” Liability Did Not
Revolutionize Title VII.55
Charlie wrote and published Accounting for Price Waterhouse in the
period between the Court’s articulation of the mixed-motives analysis in
Price Waterhouse and Congress’s codification of a modified version in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Charlie compared the pretext and mixed-motives
frameworks and made several insightful observations that presaged the
rather chaotic future ahead for the frameworks. First, both require bad
(discriminatory) thoughts and causation.56 He pointed out that causation
“takes center stage in direct evidence decisions,” but in the pretext analysis
causation is subsumed in the inference drawn from the prima facie case.57
That is why the Supreme Court never ascribed the but-for causation
standard to the pretext analysis, but the appellate courts later would retrofit
it with that standard.58 Second, Charlie recognized that all intentional
discrimination cases could be characterized as posing the pretext issue, and
they also could be characterized as raising the mixed-motives issue.59
From a commonsense perspective, all discrimination cases are likely to be
mixed motives, as good and bad motives are likely to exist in all adverse
employment decisions.60 Although there are many prescient insights in the
article, the final one that I want to emphasize is Charlie’s concluding point
that the two proof frameworks need not be rejected, but courts should be
mindful that they are “highly imperfect” tools and take care that the goals
of Title VII are paramount in each case.61 In other words, the proof
frameworks, which were not created in the statutes, are not “the thing

by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
55
Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19.
56
Sullivan, Accounting, supra note 20, at 1139–57.
57
Sullivan, Accounting, supra note 20, at 1118.
58
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 830 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir.
2016). But see Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
109, 136–38 (2007) (positing that the McDonnell Douglas analysis, despite widespread
belief to the contrary, does not prove but-for causation). Curiously, the Supreme Court has
expressly declined to decide whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to
disparate treatment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which
requires but-for causation. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517
U.S. 308, 311 (1996).
59
Sullivan, Accounting, supra note 20, at 1162.
60
Id.
61
Sullivan, Accounting, supra note 20, at 1163.
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itself,”62 and they should not become the dominant features of employment
discrimination law. That warning has not been heeded.
Mike Zimmer sought to discern in the articulations of Congress and
the Court a uniform analysis for disparate treatment cases under all of the
employment discrimination laws.63 It appeared that the uniform analysis
may be achieved when the Supreme Court in 2003 decided Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa.64 Mike discussed this prospect in one of his finest articles.65
Many of us wrote that Desert Palace rendered the McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis unsustainable and meant that all disparate treatment cases
would be evaluated under some version of the mixed-motives analysis,66 as
Charlie had suggested in 1991. We were sorely mistaken. In the years that
followed, the pretext analysis flourished, and the Court restricted
application of the mixed-motives analysis in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.,67 and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar.68
Before turning to Charlie’s recent article on the motivating factor
standard, which rounds out his work on proof frameworks in a brilliant
thirty-year retrospective, I will consider a related joint exploration of ours.
At least from Price Waterhouse forward, there have been both suggestions
by the Supreme Court that employment discrimination claims are statutory
torts, and the Court has imported tort law terms and concepts into
employment discrimination doctrine. Indeed, much of the discussion in
Price Waterhouse is about standards of causation, two of which are derived
from tort law—but-for and substantial factor. I will say more about the
Price Waterhouse causation standards below. In 2011, the Supreme Court
expressly labeled an employment discrimination statute (USERRA)69 a
statutory tort and imported the concept of proximate cause into
employment discrimination law in its decision in Staub v. Proctor
62

See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1 (quoting from Shakespeare’s King Lear).
Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563 (1996). Zimmer would further develop this
vision and examine progress by the courts in Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence:
Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693
(2000).
64
539 U.S. 90 (2003).
65
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1887.
66
See, e.g., Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-Motive Mess: Defining and Applying a Mixed
Motive Framework, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461 (2011); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The
Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L.
REV. 83 (2004); Van Detta, supra note 48, at 76.
67
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
68
570 U.S. 338 (2013).
69
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§
4301–4334.
63
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Hospital.70 That decision provoked scholarly exploration of the influence
of tort law on employment discrimination, and Charlie led that exploration
in an article in which he cautioned that the importation of proximate cause
in Staub could be a way of narrowing employment discrimination law so
that it does not apply to cognitive bias and unconscious discrimination.71
Another outstanding scholar, Sandra Sperino, followed Charlie in that
exploration.72 Many scholars then joined in a conference and symposium
issue.73 Charlie wrote an article for the symposium in which he explained
that tortification of employment discrimination is not inherently bad, but
the Court is doing it badly.74
The exploration of tortification of employment discrimination law
circles back to the exploration of proof framework/standards of causation.
In Making Too Much of Too Little, Charlie explains why the motivating
factor standard of causation has not revolutionized our legal model of
employment discrimination. In the end, he describes “motivating factor” as
“a noble failure.”75 Of course, because of the Court’s decisions in Gross
and Nassar, any revolution probably would have been confined to the
discrimination provision of Title VII.76 The motivating factor standard of
causation, which is the focus of the plaintiff’s prima facie case in the
mixed-motives analysis, has not been used by plaintiffs as much as we
anticipated it would be, and it has not resulted in a spate of plaintiffs’
victories.77 Here, it is important to trace the origins of the standard and its
development. Charlie does this in detail in his article, but I will provide a
short version here. Motivating factor was the standard adopted by the

70

562 U.S. 411 (2011).
Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1431
(2012).
72
See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and
Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013).
73
See Martha Chamallas & Sandra F. Sperino, Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration
and Conflict: Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021 (2014).
74
Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method? Torts and Other Influences
on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079 (2014).
75
Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19, at 37.
76
Whether the holdings of Gross and Nassar would be extended to the Americans
With Disabilities Act and thus preclude application of motivating factor and mixed-motives
analysis is uncertain. Compare Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228,
234 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in applying but-for causation),
and Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding
mixed-motives analysis is not applicable to the ADA based on Gross), and Serwatka v.
Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2010) (same), with Hoffman v.
Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 F. App’x 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that standard of
causation under the ADA is “motivating factor”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 45 (2015), and
Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ. 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (D. Or. 2013) (same).
77
Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19.
71
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plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse. The plurality took the mixedmotives framework and the motivating factor standard of causation from
the Court’s analysis of First Amendment claims in Mt. Healthy City Board
of Education v. Doyle.78 That Mt. Healthy opinion used the term
“motivating factor” but also used “substantial factor” and used them as
though they were interchangeable.79 Justice O’Connor in her concurrence,
however, did not regard them as interchangeable. She selected “substantial
factor” as the standard for the plaintiff’s prima facie case that would trigger
a shift in the burden of persuasion. She considered “motivating factor” too
lenient to justify shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant on the
issue of the same-decision defense.80
When Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, selected “motivating
factor” and inserted it in the discrimination provision of Title VII, there
was reason to believe that plaintiffs would be much more successful on
Title VII claims. Congress selected from the Price Waterhouse opinions
what was seemingly the lower or less stringent standard of causation. The
language originally included in the bill was “contributing” factor, but it was
changed to “motivating factor,” which the House Report described as
“cosmetic” and stated that it “w[ould] not materially change the courts’
findings.”81
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress relaxed the
but-for causation standard embodied in the language “because of.”82 Yet,
as Charlie observes, it does not appear that “motivating factor” has resulted
in heavy reliance on mixed-motives analysis by plaintiffs or yielded
significantly more plaintiff successes.83 Charlie posits several reasons for
this nonoccurrence: (1) “motivating factor” is too hard (or unfamiliar) a
concept for judges and lawyers; (2) “motivating factor” is not too hard to
understand, but too radical; and (3) plaintiffs opt out of urging its
application because it invokes the stage two same-decision limitation of

78

429 U.S. 274 (1977).
“Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that
his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ –
or to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor.’” Id. at 287. The case cited by
the Mt. Healthy Court used the term “motivating factor.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Develop. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977).
80
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (“My disagreement stems from the
plurality’s conclusions concerning the substantive requirement of causation under the
statute . . . .”).
81
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1946 (quoting 137 Cong.
Rec. H3944-45 (daily ed. June 5, 1991)).
82
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015); Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2013).
83
Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19, at 22.
79
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remedies.84
I have some reservations about saying that “motivating factor” is an
abject failure. I think plaintiffs do survive some motions for summary
judgment which they may have lost under the pretext analysis by arguing
that all they must prove to defeat summary judgment is that discrimination
was a “motivating factor” in the adverse employment actions. Admittedly,
the foregoing proposition would be hard to prove. Yet, I, like Charlie, was
a “fan” of the motivating factor causation standard that Congress enacted in
1991. Indeed, Mike Zimmer and I argued that Desert Palace rendered all
disparate treatment cases subject to the motivating factor standard in the
mixed-motives analysis.85 Mike argued that the McDonnell Douglas
framework remained viable, but had very limited application.86 I went
further and argued that, without a line of demarcation between the two
proof structures, such as direct evidence before Desert Palace, the pretext
framework was no longer viable.87 Mike lauded the potential of the
statutory mixed-motives analysis:
Under the approach adopted in § 703(m), all of these different
types of evidence can help form the basis for a reasonable
factfinder to draw the inference of discrimination under the “a
motivating factor” standard for establishing liability. Looking at
the litigation of individual discrimination cases from the
viewpoint of a court determining a motion for summary
judgment, the correct approach under § 703(m) closely
resembles the approach used in general litigation.88
Charlie now regards “motivating factor” as a noble failure. He has
persuaded me that Congress’s codification of this relaxed standard of
causation was a mistake, but perhaps for different reasons. First, the
standard, in retrospect, was destined to fail. The Supreme Court, even
before Price Waterhouse, regarded the employment discrimination statutes
as statutory torts. In her Price Waterhouse concurrence, Justice O’Connor
discussed tort causation standards and the underlying tort case law.89
“Motivating factor” is not a tort causation standard, and the Supreme Court
84

See Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19, at 23, 26, 34.
See Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1943 (stating that
“litigating individual discrimination cases using § 703(m) is feasible for all Title VII
individual discrimination cases”).
86
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1940.
87
See generally William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1549 (2005).
88
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1937–38.
89
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264–65 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 84–87 (1948); Kingston v. Chicago &
N.W.R. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 616 (1927); 2 J. WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 153 (1912)).
85

CORBETT (DO NOT DELETE)

1298

5/7/2020 4:48 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1283

prefers to import tort principles into employment discrimination law.90
More significantly, however, “motivating factor” anchors the mixedmotives proof framework in the discredited idea that discriminators
typically are motivated by discriminatory impulses, suggesting that they are
aware of them—that they have a conscious intent to discriminate. This is
how the plurality explained “motivating factor” in Price Waterhouse.91
The work of Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger and many scholars who
followed her has undermined the idea that most discrimination is the
product of conscious motivation.92 Even if we applaud Congress for
attempting to lower the standard of causation in the plaintiff’s prima facie
case, we should be reluctant to embrace a standard of causation that adopts
the discredited motivation-based model of the universe of employment
discrimination.
Finally, explorations with Charlie of proof structures and affiliated
causation standards lead me to the most overarching exploration in which I
have followed him: the Court’s inaccurate and harmfully narrow model of
the universe of employment discrimination. There are two and only two
theories: disparate treatment and disparate impact, and never the two shall
meet.93 First, this seems like an unnecessarily restrictive model of the
universe that the Court already has recognized.
Why are nonaccommodation, harassment, and stereotyping not co-equal theories (or
planets)? Professors David Oppenheimer and Stephanie Bornstein have
argued that the Court already has recognized theories of discrimination
beyond treatment and impact.94 They further argue that it should recognize
broader theories, with Oppenheimer arguing for recognition of negligent
discrimination, and Bornstein for reckless discrimination. I, too, have
argued that forcing all discrimination cases into a disparate treatment or
disparate impact theory with associated proof frameworks does not
accurately depict either the actual universe of discrimination or the model
that the Court has developed to date.95
The research on cognitive and implicit bias suggests that the Court’s
limited model of the discrimination universe never has been accurate.
90
Cf. Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the MixedMotives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 19 (1991)
(discussing the nuances of mixed-motives cases and criticizing the focus on causation and
positing that “the concept of such ‘factors’ is one that has not been, and cannot be, given
any coherent sense”).
91
Id. at 63.
92
See supra note 23.
93
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015).
94
See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 899, 967–72 (1993); Bornstein, supra note 22, at 1103–07.
95
See Corbett, Breaking Dichotomies, supra note 27, at 807.
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Charlie’s article Employing AI demonstrates that this disconnect is likely to
be exacerbated by the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) to make
employment decisions. To begin with, a disparate treatment theory
requiring proof of a motivating factor seems ill-suited to AI, which lacks
motivation. Although disparate impact will capture some cases of
discrimination resulting from data mining and algorithms,96 Charlie,
Pauline Kim,97 Stephanie Bornstein,98 and others have demonstrated that
the current model of disparate impact will not address many of these cases.
Charlie concludes Employing AI by stating that “[o]ne critical lesson is that
the Supreme Court’s bifurcation of all discrimination into two theories, is
very problematic, at least unless the theories are radically revised.”99
I have followed Charlie into several parts of the universe of
employment discrimination. With his help and guidance, I have tried to
make sense of the Court’s model, consisting of two theories. Charlie also
took me along for an exploration of the dichotomy of proof frameworks
and the associated causation standards. Related to this, he led me to
explore the tortification of employment discrimination law and helped me
understand that the importation of tort principles was not necessarily or
inherently detrimental to the model.
As we face the rapid proliferation of use of AI in making employment
decisions, the Court’s model of the universe of employment discrimination
seems increasingly inadequate. We are long past the time when the Court
and Congress should be willing to realize that disparate treatment and
disparate impact may not be planets, or if their classification as such is to
be preserved, then they should develop a view that permits recognition of
many more. As fond as I was of Pluto, it had to be deplanetized or new
planets had to be recognized. Either approach would change forever our
familiar and comfortable model. As complacent as we may have grown
with the theories, proof structures, and causation standards, they
increasingly do not provide an accurate description of the universe of
employment discrimination.
IV. THEORIZING A NEW MODEL
The new model that I have in mind does not jettison all of the
concepts that have comprised the old one. A larger and less restricted
96

Pauline Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857,
890–91 (2017); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 701–12 (2016).
97
Kim, supra note 96, at 890.
98
Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 567
(2018).
99
Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 428.
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model, however, could be built not on the old planets, but by going back to
the statutory language “because of . . .” The Court has limited that
terminology in Gross and Nassar to mean a but-for causation standard, but
that was not an obvious or necessary decision. Congress and the Court
always have treated the theories, proof frameworks, and causation
standards as the foundation on which the model is based. None of that,
however, is statutory. In Employing A1, Charlie recommended an approach
that emanates from the statutory language:
However, there’s a more direct and more textual way to reach
the same result without treating Arti [an AI program] as human,
although that requires abandoning the Court’s bifurcated
structure and returning to the text of the statute. The governing
language of Title VII (and other antidiscrimination laws) clearly
proscribes Arti’s use of gender as a selection criterion, and does
so entirely without the need for either of the two theories
articulated by the Court over the years. The core prohibition of
Title VII is § 703, whose two subsections have been viewed as
the basis, respectively, of disparate treatment and disparate
impact liability. But, entirely apart from the judicial gloss of
each subsection, the language of the statute would declare Arti’s
gender-explicit criterion a violation under both prongs.100
Other scholars have recommended that distinct and rigid theories and
proof structures are not necessary to prove and analyze employment
discrimination claims. In recommending the rejection of the McDonnell
Douglas pretext structure after the Supreme Court decided St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks,101 Professor Deborah Malamud argued that
maintaining these special rules for discrimination cases is harmful because
it creates the false impression that there are preferential rules for plaintiffs,
when in fact the “rules” do not function that way.102 She concluded that it
may be better to let the “cold winds of litigation blow.”103 In a similar
vein, Mike Zimmer thought that a principal advantage of the mixedmotives framework was that all evidence could be presented under the
“motivating factor” standard rather than being forced into one of the three
stages of the pretext analysis.104 This open-ended approach, he argued,
“closely resembles the approach used in general litigation.”105 But as
Charlie has shown, “motivating factor” has been used little and has been, to
100

Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 407.
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
102
Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 2229, 2324 (1995).
103
Id.
104
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1937–38.
105
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1938.
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some extent, a failure.106
It is not necessary to deplanetize everything that exists in the current
model in order to create a new model. There is, however, a danger in
keeping the familiar model and trying to build a more open one on it. For
example, the Seventh Circuit in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.107
considered its prior effort to develop a less structured approach to proving
discrimination by saying that a plaintiff can present a “convincing mosaic”
of evidence of discrimination. This sounds like the approach for which I
am advocating. Lower courts and even the Seventh Circuit itself, however,
understood this to be a new and additional proof structure, and the court
had to circle back in Ortiz to explain that it had not intended to create a
new test of discrimination.108 Maintaining the structures of the current
model risks creating a new model that remains focused on them.
Going back to the language of the statues and permitting a plaintiff to
present the evidence of discrimination without classifying the claim as
disparate treatment or disparate impact and funneling all evidence into a
proof framework would be a new and simpler model of employment
discrimination. It also might capture the variety of forms of discrimination
that exist in the universe. The courts’ and Congress’s tenacious adherence
to the familiar model will make such a change difficult.
Realistically, however, I think the Supreme Court and Congress will
adhere to the familiar concepts. Indeed, there is now some necessity based
on current statutory language to classify cases as disparate treatment or
disparate impact. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 incorporates those concepts
with meaningful distinction in the statutes in § 1981a, which makes jury
trials and compensatory and punitive damages available in cases of
“unlawful intentional discrimination,” (or disparate treatment cases).109
Still, less insistence by the Court on the current rigid classification scheme
would improve the model. Although the Court did not admit to doing so, it
blended concepts from disparate treatment and disparate impact in Young v.
United Parcel Service, Inc.110 The Court could expressly recognize other
theories of discrimination.111 Beneath the level of the theories, there is
nothing in the statutes that requires that cases be divided into direct and
circumstantial evidence cases112 and then funneled into proof frameworks.
106

See supra text accompanying notes 83–84, 89–92.
834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).
108
Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764–65.
109
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)–(2) (2018).
110
575 U.S. 206 (2015). For discussion of the blending, see generally William R.
Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: McDonnell Douglas to the Rescue?, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 1683 (2015).
111
See supra text accompanying notes 94–95.
112
See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765–66. As discussed above, doing this runs afoul of the
107
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Some courts have recognized that the pretext framework is not a suitable
analysis for some cases, and it actually can obscure the real issue in the
discrimination claim.113
Although any new map of the universe undoubtedly would retain
familiar terms, categories, and characterizations, it could be a more fluid
and diverse model. The original statutory language will support such a
map of the universe. The deplanetization of Pluto should have occurred
many years ago in employment discrimination law.
V. EXPLORING AND THEORIZING WITH CHARLIE
I do not know what Charlie may think of my latest idea. He has been
a kind and helpful guide in our explorations, although he knows I have
gotten off course more than once. I am privileged to have a friend, mentor
and guide like Charlie Sullivan. Wherever we go from here in developing
models of the universe of employment discrimination, I feel better knowing
that Charlie is going before me.

Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace. See supra text accompanying notes 44–50.
113
See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328, 1346 n.86 (11th
Cir. 2011).

